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Abstract: This paper uses the example of the Covid-19 pandemic to analyse the danger 
associated with insufficient pluralism in evidence-based public health policy. Drawing on 
certain elements in Paul Feyerabend’s political philosophy of science, it discusses reasons for 
implementing more pluralism as well as challenges to be tackled on the way forward. 
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We live in an age of evidence-based policy. Recent attacks on science in the US, Germany 
and other countries and greater public scrutiny – sometimes leading to outright denial – of 
scientific knowledge are no contradiction to this claim. On the contrary, one important factor 
driving skeptical and anti-science movements is precisely the fact that science has become 
much more relevant to policy-making and public life than ever before.1 
 
The significance of science for policy-making was hardly ever more visible than during the 
Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. Scientific experts informed and drove governmental crisis 
management and public health policy strategies in many countries and on many levels. In 
the US, the UK and the EU, for example, epidemiological models and scientific advice had 
a direct influence on the implementation of lock-down measures to prevent disease spread 
and on the development of strategies to deal with the pandemic on a long-term basis (e.g. 
Adam, 2020). 
 
There have been two main lines of criticism about the way science informed and guided 
policy during the Covid-19 pandemic. The first type of criticism concerns the fact that 
government action has been mainly driven by numbers of Covid-19 cases and deaths at the 
expense of other aspects of the situation. For example, Caduff (2020) claims that many 
governments failed to take into account the drastic impact of lock-down measures on the 
economy and the lives of less affluent citizens. The second type of criticism concerns in silico 
modelling and its central role in strategic policy decisions. It has been pointed out that 
                                                        
1 This is not meant to deny the importance of other factors that contribute to anti-science tendencies, such as 
economic interests and manufactured doubt (Oreskes & Conway, 2010). 
  2 
policy-making relied far too much on epidemiological modelling despite the fact that even 
the best computer models suffer from severe uncertainty and that they can contain 
misleading mathematical simplifications (Saltelli et al., 2020). As a consequence, policy-
making may have been guided by only apparently exact projections of the effects of certain 
policy measures while not paying enough attention to alternative information for policy-
making. 
 
While both types of criticism address different issues, they share a concern about insufficient 
epistemic pluralism in the public health measures that were implemented to address the 
Covid-19 pandemic. In the following, we provide a short analysis of the problems arising 
from insufficient epistemic pluralism in a public health context that is inspired by certain 
elements in Paul Feyerabend’s political philosophy of science. The goal is to deepen our 
understanding of potential epistemic shortcomings of evidence-based public health policy 
and to provide part of a multi-layered answer to a key question in this context: How should 
we design future evidence-based policies in the context of public health threats? 
 
The diagnosis of insufficient epistemic pluralism is rather straightforward in both lines of 
criticism mentioned above. In both cases, policy-making seems to have been constrained in 
that it mainly focused on one epistemic perspective. According to the first line of criticism, 
public health policy was developed primarily from a biomedical perspective at the expense 
of alternative viewpoints, e.g. viewpoints based on local knowledge or non-scientific forms of 
knowledge. According to the second line, policy making was constrained by epidemiological 
modelling ignoring relevant perspectives form other biomedical disciplines and the social 
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sciences. The first type of criticism mainly  concerns a lack of pluralism regarding viewpoints 
that are external to science, while the second type concerns a lack of pluralism within science 
itself. Both forms of insufficient pluralism – external and internal to science – are problematic 
from an epistemological point of view.2  
 
First, there is a risk of developing a myopic, epidemiology-centric description of reality that 
can lead to imbalanced policy decisions. For instance, the strong focus on the numbers of 
Covid-19 cases and deaths may have led to one-sided harm-benefit analyses that only 
addressed Covid-19-related health threats while disregarding potential and/or latent social 
issues that have been consequences of pandemic crisis management. Likewise, the 
overreliance on Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SRI) models may have structurally excluded 
potentially useful knowledge from other biological disciplines or the social sciences, 
knowledge that could have been crucial for more rational policy interventions (Manzo, 2020). 
 
Second, we know little about pandemics and their development in general. But even if this 
were the case, there are always good reasons to take a fallibilistic stance towards our current 
best scientific knowledge. Disease statistics can always misrepresent and models can always 
be wrong. We should thus “keep our options open” (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 12) and promote 
the development and use of alternative ways to understanding what is going on.  
 
                                                        
2 We wish to thank Thomas Reydon for his helpful comments and for encouraging us to further develop the 
plea for more pluralism in public health policy, which will be done in a forthcoming publication on the topic. 
  4 
Third, and in line with another key argument by Feyerabend (1999[1968]), it is always 
rational to develop alternative approaches to any given epistemic problem to better 
understand the shortcomings of each alternative. It is only when one has an independent 
perspective on the local side-effects of policy-measures that deal with the Covid-19 pandemic 
that one can see what (else) might be missing from the picture of a specific public health 
strategy, and insights and methodological approaches from social scientists can be vital in 
identifying misguided assumptions in the prediction of epidemiological models. 
 
What follows from the observed lack of epistemic pluralism in the management of the Covid-
19 crisis? It seems that the right move would be to strengthen epistemic pluralism in 
evidence-based public health policy. Many more perspectives should be included in providing 
the evidence for policy-making and many more stakeholders should get a voice in policy-
counselling (instead of criticizing policy-making from the outside). This would include not 
only epidemiologists, social scientists and scholars from other fields but also experts who 
could contribute local knowledge of relevant social spheres, such as nurses or education 
department heads who know which hygiene measures can realistically be implemented in 
their primary schools. 
 
It is important to note, however, this strategy is fraught with challenges. Among the most 
pressing are the following three: (a) There are pragmatic constraints on the inclusion of 
more, diverse perspectives and types of evidence in policy-making, especially in times of 
acute public health threats. How many perspectives can be included without completely 
paralyzing the policy process? (b) Exchange between diverse perspectives has to be 
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facilitated while avoiding the inclusion of what Feyerabend has called “cranks” (see the 
discussion in Shaw, 2020), i.e. stakeholders who are only interested in defending their own 
point of view or interests, and not in the open exchange of ideas and in learning from each 
other (think “conspiracy theorists”). (c) Differences in epistemic standards and authority 
have to be overcome. Everybody who has ever worked in an inter- or transdisciplinary 
environment knows how challenging it can be to discuss different methods, findings and 
other types of knowledge when epistemic standards are divergent. We should also expect 
differences in authority (and prestige) between policy experts, scientists and experts on local 
knowledge. Those may lead to imbalanced discussions, instead of genuine dialogue, and need 
to be alleviated by actively designing deliberative processes in order to facilitate a productive 
form of pluralistic exchange at eye level (Barker & Kitcher, 2014, p. 155ff). 
 
Addressing the issue of insufficient epistemic pluralism as well as the sketched challenges 
associated with pluralism is essential for improving evidence-based public health policy, in 
particular in the context of acute public health threats. Both aspects should therefore be 
on the agenda of scholars who think about evidence-for-use in policy contexts and related 
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